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Organic  agriculture  is  a rapidly growing segment
of the  food  industry.  According  to the  Organic
Trade Association,  organic  food sales totalled $4
billion in 1997, having posted  sales growths of 20
percent  or greater for nine consecutive years. Na-
tionwide,  31  percent of consumers  state they buy
organic at least once a month and 23 percent buy it
once  a week or more. Organic agriculture plays a
prominent role states such as New York as well-
one  certifying  agency,  NOFA-NY,  certifies  172
farms  that produce  a full array of farm  products
including fruits, vegetables, fruit juices, hay, grains,
beef, transplants,  dairy products, and eggs. Many
farmers in the northeast see organic agriculture as
a way of diversifying their operations,  gain a pre-
mium and  stay in business in this era of declining
farm numbers.
The  market for  organic agricultural  products
is of interest to food marketers not only because of
its rapid growth and importance to smaller grow-
ers but because of the interactions of public policy,
private firm  strategy,  and  consumer preferences.
Organic is a credence good trait (Darby and Kami),
i.e.,  a consumer  cannot  easily verify whether  an
item is truly organic  either by observation (search
goods)  or consuming  (experience  goods)  trait
(Darby and Karni).  Consequently,  a third party is
needed to verify such claims to protect consumers
from fraud and to legitimate producers, processors,
etc. Until late last year, this function was served by
a number of independent certifying agencies, each
of which potentially  had a different definition  of
organic. Lohr observed that creating a unified na-
tional set of standards would help dispel the confu-
sion over the exact meaning  of organic, facilitat-
ing both international  and domestic commerce of
organic foods.
Beginning in the early 1990s the USDA began
work on drafting such a set of standards.  The origi-
nal proposed rule was met with much controversy.
USDA  received  over  275,000  comments  on the
proposal,  many of which expressed  concern  over
the inclusion of what came to be known as the Big
3:  Genetically  Modified  Organisms  (GMOs),
Biosolids (Municipal Sewage Sludge), and Irradia-
tion. When the Final Rule was announced in early
2001,  use of the Big 3 was not allowed for foods
labeled  organic.  Given this controversy,  it is im-
portant to know if this Final Rule actually reflects
consumer  preferences,  and what  implications  it
holds for private strategy and public policy.
This paper builds upon the empirical analysis
of a survey administered to current consumers of
organic  food in Ithaca, NY, a town  known for its
vibrant market  for organic  food.  It discusses  the
implications  of this rule for public policy and pri-
vate strategy. Three fundamental issues at hand are
how much consumers are willing to pay to have or
to avoid the Big 3 in organic  food, the policy im-
plications of these  results, and how firms can use
this information to guide marketing strategies.
Survey Findings
A survey was administered  to current consumers
of organic  food  in Ithaca,  NY. The surveys were
given at the two  locations where  organic  food is
sold most prominently:  the local farmers'  market
and a cooperative "health food" market. The major
supermarket in the area with a significant organic
section declined to allow the surveying to take place
there. Research  has shown that a vast majority or
organic food is bought in health food stores (Reicks
et al.) rather than in supermarkets,  and a large num-
ber of organic growers sell at the farmers'  market,
so patrons at these locations are likely to be typical
of consumers of organic food in Ithaca.
The  surveys  were complied over several  ses-
sions in the fall of 2000. The farmers market oper-
ates on Saturdays and Sundays. The market's board
of directors only granted permission to collect data
on Sundays. Data were collected  on September 30
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and October 7, 2000. To reach people with a vari-
ety of shopping habits, the questionnaire  was ad-
ministered  at the  cooperative  market  on selected
Tuesdays, Wednesdays,  and Saturdays, both morn-
ings and afternoons. Only people who currently buy
organic food were included. A total of 122 usable
surveys were compiled from both locations.
The surveys had three main components:  a sec-
tion  on  attitudes  and  shopping  habits,  including
what  and how much  organic  food shoppers  buy,
why they buy it, and what they believe ought to be
included in the definition of organic; a Contingent
Valuation component measuring their Willingness
To Pay (WTP) to have or to avoid each of the Big 3
included in the definition;  and demographic traits
such as age, gender, education  and income.
The  Contingent  Valuation  portion  elicited
open-ended  responses  to the Willingness  To Pay
(WTP) question. The baseline was a food item that
they normally buy  organic and that costs $1. It is
certified organic, but by agencies that allow the use
of GMOs, biosolids, and irradiation, respectively.
Respondents were asked how much they would pay
for a bag of the same item, identical in appearance,
nutrition, freshness, etc., but that is certified by an
agency that does not allow the use of GMOs, etc.
Results of the survey show that consumers favor a
strict definition of organic. When asked if each of
the Big 3 ought to be allowed,  85, 80,  and 76 per-
cent of respondents said that GMOs, biosolids, and
irradiation, respectively should not be allowed; the
remaining  percent  replied either  it should  be al-
lowed,  no  opinion  or don't know.  Similarly,  63,
80, 95, and 76 percent  say that manure from  non-
organic  farms, antibiotics,  growth regulators,  and
confinement  of animals,  respectively,  should  not
be allowed.
Consumers are willing to pay to avoid the Big
3 in organic  foods.  The mean and median  premi-
ums they will pay for GMO-free organic food are
$0.75 and $.50. For biosolid-free the mean is $0.78
and the median $0.50; for irradiation-free, the mean
is $0.75  and the median is $0.50. Note that they are
willing to pay these sums  over and above  the or-
ganic premium to avoid the Big 3, and the median
figure implies a majority are willing to pay a posi-
tive amount.
These  WTP measures  were  regressed on  the
various demographic and attitudinal characteristics
to discover market segments for organic foods free
of the Big 3. Results  indicate that women,  older
people, those who spend a larger percentage of their
current food budget on organic, and those who live
in counties with metro areas (as defined by the U.S.
Census) are likely to pay a larger amount to avoid
the Big 3 in organic food.
These  findings  have  two  main  implications.
First, for the most part the USDA National Organic
Program's  Final  Rule  largely  reflects  consumer
preferences,  especially the exclusion of the Big 3.
In fact, of all the practices and inputs listed on the
survey (all of which a majority of respondents did
not want to be  included), only  manure from  non-
organic  farms  is actually  allowed under the Final
Rule (and it had the smallest majority favoring its
ban).
Second, avoidance of the Big 3 is important to
consumers, and organic foods that expressly state
the absence of these practices may provide another
niche market. As discussed below, some firms are
placing  a small "GMO-free"  label  on their prod-
uct, along with the "certified organic" seal to high-
light this trait of their good, in spite of the fact that
it is, in a sense, redundant: organic already implies
GMO-free.  The fact that firms incur the extra cost
of printing the GMO-free label on the package im-
plies  several beliefs  about consumers:  that many
consumers are not aware that organic implies GMO-
free, that firms believe the increased revenue gained
from providing this information is greater than the
extra labeling cost, and that people with a prefer-
ence for organic  food are  likely to have  an aver-
sion to GMOs as well.
Public-Policy Implications
Theoretically,  any  time  government  provides  in-
formation  in the marketplace the goal  is to facili-
tate the market, e.g., lower transaction costs by pro-
viding information that the market will not or can-
not provide, etc. Given the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the producers and consumers on how
the good was produced and the credence good qual-
ity of organic, the potential gains from a coherent,
mutually understood  and  accepted  set of organic
standards are vast.
Originally, the organic label was largely pro-
ducer oriented. In New York State, certification was
done by NOFA-NY, a producer organization, who
determined  what  practices  were  allowable,  and
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charged  a fee to each  farm for the right to  label
their  food  as "certified  organic  by NOFA-NY."
Without certification, these farms would likely have
had to sell their produce as conventional and would
have received  no organic  price premium  despite
possibly incurring greater production costs. With-
out certification,  any buyer would assume that the
item was not organic.  This label  and process help
to protect legitimate producers by preventing oth-
ers  from falsely claiming items were  organic  and
receiving the premium price.
For consumers, who ultimately pay for the cer-
tification  by paying  a premium  for organic food,
the label serves as a source of information that fa-
cilitates the market. Without such a process the only
way  a consumer can  guarantee  she  is consuming
organic  food is to either grow all her own food or
be  present at every  stage  of production and  pro-
cessing for every food item she buys. Both of  these
options entail prohibitively high costs for most con-
sumers.
The organic label  is one of several  examples
of cases where firms tout some credence good trait,
a trait they believe will be of value to the consumer.
Examples  include cruelty-free  cosmetics, dolphin
friendly tuna, "green" labeled goods, etc. Items not
so labeled can be assumed to be tested on animals,
harmful to dolphins, more polluting, etc. These la-
bels assume that there is a segment of society con-
cerned enough about the issue at hand to pay a pre-
mium (sufficient to cover the labeling expense and,
in most cases, reflecting a more expensive produc-
tion process)  for this type of good. A key role for
public policy is to guarantee the veracity of these
claims.  Hadden  discusses  a continuum  of policy
actions to assist consumers  in managing risk, with
no action at one end of the spectrum,  a ban at the
other end and in between  a range of actions  from
voluntary  labeling to mandatory  labeling  to per-
formance and process standards.
In some cases, third parties verify these claims.
In such cases, the producers agree to conform to an
existing set of standards in exchange for the "seal
of approval"  from the  outside agency.  This prac-
tice  is  similar to the way that  signatories  of the
Sullivan  Principles  agreed  to practice  non-racist
business  practices  in apartheid-era  South Africa;
members of the Valdez Principles agree  to main-
tain high environmental standards to gain the posi-
tive publicity of being a signatory of this accord.
Economic theory states that a system of grades
and standards can facilitate the market by condens-
ing a great deal of information about a product into
a single and universally accepted convention. A uni-
versally understood  definition  of organic that re-
flects consumer preferences provides information
that greatly decreases transaction costs and coordi-
nation problems for both consumers and producers
in this market. The empirical data presented above
suggest that the USDA Final Rule reflects the pref-
erences  of organic consumers.  However,  there  is
evidence of problems  as well. First, the presence
of the redundant GMO-free  label on organic corn
chips indicates that the label definition of organic
is not understood  by many  consumers.  A public
campaign aimed at educating consumers about what
"organic"  means  is  indicated.  Second,  it is clear
that  many  consumers  wish  to  avoid  consuming
GMO foods, but whether or not they will have the
opportunity  to buy  GMO-free  foods  is  in  doubt.
The "Starlink" corn incidents of 2000 demonstrated
how ill-equipped  our food  system  is to segregate
Genetically  Modified  (GM)  corn  from  non-GM
corn,  even  in the  case where  that variety of GM
corn was  not  approved  for human  consumption.
Furthermore,  the risk of contamination of organic
or non-GM  crops  by drifting  pollen  is immense,
particularly for crops such as corn which produce
pollen that can travel huge  distances.  Some  pro-
ducers are even concerned that if pollen from a GM
corn field drifts into an organic farmer's field and
fertilizes  his  sweet  corn he  may sacrifice  his  or-
ganic  certification,  since organic  certification  re-
quires  that no banned  substances  or practices  be
used for three years prior to certification,  will he
lose his certified status if GM corn pollen infects
his field?
Clearly,  some sort of policy is needed is to en-
sure that producers  and  consumers  who  want to
grow and buy GMO-free  foods are able to do so.
Reasonable "buffer zones" must be established and
liability assigned to protect GMO-free producers:
seed companies  should be liable  if contamination
occurs despite the maintenance of the buffer zone,
and producers who fail to respect these zones must
be liable as well. Furthermore,  since to some ex-
tent the proverbial horse is already out of the barn,
maximum tolerances of GM content in food labeled
GMO-free and/or organic must be formulated and
enforced. Such standards must reflect both consum-
48  March 2002Consumer Preferences  for Organic Standards  49
ers right not to consume GM foods and producers'
rights to continue to operate their businesses as they
see fit. In other words, standards must be stringent
enough to make the GMO-free  claim meaningful
but not so restrictive that the degree of contamina-
tion so far precludes any U.S. grower from making
this claim.  Similar  guidelines  exist for pesticide
residues  on organic  food resulting  from spillover
contamination  rather than from direct application
by the growers.  This would be a good template to
use for the basis of GMO-free  status.
On a more general note, policy can do much to
ensure the continued growth of the market for or-
ganic goods. Given the plethora of positive exter-
nalities  associated  with  organic  agriculture  (e.g.,
environmental, social, and economic), public policy
that facilitates  this market  is bound to  generate a
lot of social  good. Organic agriculture  is not only
widely  believed  to  be more environmentally  be-
nign  (Reganold  et al.),  it  is also  associated  with
smaller farms and therefore  healthier community
societies  and  economies  (Ikerd,  1999a,  1999b,
1999c; Strange; Goldschmidt).  In a sense, organic
producers internalize many of the external costs as-
sociated  with the  conventional,  industrialized,
chemical-intensive production system. Organic ag-
riculture  also provides  many  public  goods  even
beyond  those  of conventional  agriculture.  Eco-
nomic theory justifies public policies that support
organic  agriculture:  government  intervention  is
needed in markets where  externalities are present
if the socially optimal allocation of resources is to
be achieved.
Policies  to promote  organic  food include  in-
formation  on  its food  safety,  environmental  im-
pacts,  and  contributions  to community  develop-
ment. Governments  could sponsor generic  adver-
tising for organic food. Additional resources should
be put into researching organic production and dis-
tribution, and policies that favor the conventional
should  be amended to offset the huge  advantage
that the latter method has enjoyed  due to present
policy. Finally, venues at which small organic grow-
ers sell, such as farmers' markets, could be eligible
for tax breaks  and public investment.
Floor-vs.-Ceiling  Issue
Although the Final Rule meshes well with consumer
preferences as revealed in the survey and its deci-
sion to ban the Big 3 met with the approval of most
producer groups, many of these farm organizations
still find fault with the Rule. Specifically, as NOFA-
NY states, they wanted a floor while the Final Rule
is a ceiling. In other words, the Rule does not allow
individual  agencies  (e.g.,  NOFA-NY)  to require
standards  more  stringent than  the  federal  stan-
dards-farms  cannot be required to meet extra re-
quirements beyond federal standards to qualify for
NOFA certification. Another fault in the Rule, ac-
cording to NOFA-NY,  is that the federal  govern-
ment has a monopoly on the word "organic"-no
firm is able to call their product "organic"  unless it
has been  certified by an agency  approved  by the
USDA.  In the past,  many  smaller farms,  for ex-
ample, sold "organic" food without being certified.
Implications for Private-Firm Strategy
Marketing  strategy  employed  by  private  firms
within  the  food  marketing  system  makes  use  of
product  standards  to  differentiate  their  offerings
from their competitors'  and to signal to customers
the unique image of their products. Until recently,
unified public standards for organic food products
were  nonexistent;  as  a result,  standards  imposed
by private firms were largely off the radar screen-
they existed within local markets with little notice
from marketing researchers. Now that organic foods
have an explicit pubic standard,  are private strate-
gies consistent with public  standards? Do  private
strategies  for organic food reflect our understand-
ing of the  consumer's  willingness  to pay  for  se-
lected  organic  food  attributes?  Private strategies
will be influenced by public policy, structure of  the
firm, and product life cycles.
With respect to the  organization  of the firm/
market  institutions,  three  alternatives  can  be ex-
amined:  industrial  food systems (investor owned
retail food store), farmers'  markets,  and coopera-
tively owned health food store outlets. These insti-
tutions differ in how they address consumer pref-
erences. In industrial nations like the US and those
in Western Europe, the retail food store has emerged
as the dominant  organization  used by consumers
to conduct  food shopping. Through retail  outlets,
thousands of new food products are introduced each
year. With the help of information technology (e.g.,
scanner data, "preferred shoppers cards,"  etc.) the
modern retail  food system  consistently  monitors
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their consumers'  purchases to meet their changing
preferences  and realigns itself to strategically co-
ordinate (vertically and horizontally) the industrial
food system.
Perhaps  the most widespread  market  institu-
tion for horticultural produce (a major organic food
category) is the local farmers' market (for example,
the  Ithaca  Farmers'  Market).  Comprising  both
wholesale and retail exchanges, the institution ex-
hibits a variety of forms depending on the particu-
lar geographic location and the legal and economic
environments. A distinguishing  characteristic of a
farmers' market is the mixture of formal and infor-
mal sector operators and activities that co-exist for
almost all commodities.  They are also marked by a
great deal of familiarity and trust between growers
and customers.
The  establishment  of food  cooperatives  (for
example,  Ithaca's  Green  Star)  as  an institutional
remedy  for market failures  has been an accepted
policy  alternative  for most countries.  Scarcely  a
nation in the world is without a "cooperative"  or-
ganization. Socialist or capitalist, industrialized  or
developing, all countries claim them and most coun-
tries nurture them. Many governments grant coop-
eratives special legal privileges; lines of credit; and
public, technical,  and sometimes promotional sup-
port.  A cooperative  may be defined as a business
organization  in which  the same  group of people
own, control,  and use the services  as members of
the organization.  Members acting collectively  are
able to influence the market and create demand for
goods reflecting their unique tastes that would be
difficult for them to purchase as individuals.
Before  identifying  firm  strategies  associated
with each organization,  a brief discussion of how
the product life cycle (PLC) can influence firm strat-
egy is appropriate.  The PLC asserts that products
enter  four  distinct stages  (introduction,  growth,
maturity, and decline) over time; a prescribed mar-
keting strategy is associated with each stage of the
cycle. The PLC tool is problematic for several rea-
sons, but chief among them is determining the ap-
propriate  stage  in which  a product falls.  For the
purpose of our presentation, we assume that organic
food products are in the introductory  stage of the
PLC. In the introductory stage of the cycle the price
and  promotion  elements  of the  "marketing mix"
become relatively more useful to the firm in shap-
ing its strategy than do product and place elements.
Introductory-stage  marketing  strategies  are  sug-
gested  for each  market  organization  described
above. Pricing strategy varies across the organiza-
tional  forms to  reflect  a "premium  pricing strat-
egy" for industrial food retail outlets and coopera-
tive  outlets.  Farmers'  markets  are  more likely to
pursue a "competitive pricing strategy". Promotion
strategies observed at the Ithaca Farmers'  Market
followed  only the "organic  standard".  This result
seems contrary to our empirical findings that sup-
port the notion that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for GMO-, biosolid-, and irradiation-free
food.  Yet, none of these attributes  is widely used
by food-marketing outlets within the supply chain.
Data from this paper indicate  that there is an
untapped market  for GMO-free  foods  among  or-
ganic  consumers and that many consumers  of or-
ganic do not realize that organic implies GMO-free.
There is an opportunity for organic producers and
distributors to take advantage of this by highlight-
ing avoidance of GMOs as a feature consumers get
"for free" when they buy organic. Organic can also
be promoted as the surest way to avoid GMOs even
for those  who do not currently  buy  organic.  Pro-
motion efforts  should be targeted at the segments
mentioned  above  as well  as  at the demographic
group the Hartman  Group identifies  as the "True
Naturals," those who make up the core of the de-
mand for organic.
Conclusions
The  organic  label  serves  a vital  function  in the
market, protecting producers  and decreasing trans-
action costs for consumers who prefer this kind of
food.  Survey results  indicate that the USDA's Fi-
nal  Rule  is  in accord with  consumer  preferences
and that consumers are willing to pay a price above
the  organic premium  to avoid the "Big  3"  in  or-
ganic food. However, voluntary labeling efforts by
certain  corn-chip  makers  suggest that the  labels'
meaning is not well understood by consumers; these
firms  have  highlighted  a trait of their  product
("GMO-free")  that is  already  implied  by the  or-
ganic label.
This  lack of understanding  both  necessitates
public  policy to  educate consumers  and provides
opportunities for private firms to differentiate their
products to conform to consumer preferences. Pub-
lic efforts to inform the public about the meaning
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of the organic label and the benefits of buying or-
ganic products are needed.  Firms  can employ  ei-
ther a premium price strategy (exploiting the con-
sumers' stated willingness to pay to avoid GMOs)
or a competitive  price  strategy (emphasizing  that
consumers  are getting GMO-free  at no extra cost
by buying organic).
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